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FOREWORD 
David Rudenstine* 
Legal academics and law reviews usually focus their attention on 
doctrine or legal philosophy, or the interfacing of other disciplines 
with either one or both. It is rare that they study and assess the writ­
ings of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. Indeed, with few excep­
tions, most members of the Supreme Court leave the bench without 
ever having their writings reviewed and assessed as a whole. In Octo­
ber 1990, however, a group of prominent legal scholars gathered at 
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, under the auspices of the 
Jacob Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, to assay Justice 
Scalia's jurispmdence, even though he has been a member of the 
Court for less than five years.' 
The idea of the conference was based on the speculative view that 
Scalia's judicial writings are distinctively influential. This seems true 
not so much with Scalia's colleagues on the high Court, as it is with 
some federal and state court judges. Moreover, Scalia's influence 
seems to extend well beyond the judiciary to those who participate in 
the pubhc debate on the important issues the Court regularly con­
fronts and on the role of the Court itself in our govemmental 
stmcture. 
Several factors appear to combine to draw attention to Scalia's 
writings and to make them influential. Scalia's substantive positions 
on issues of public as well as academic interest are controversial, if not 
extreme.^ This has not been entirely surprising since Scalia was nomi­
nated by President Reagan to the Court as a judicial conservative who 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and the Conference Director. I 
wish to thank the Jacob Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies for the grant that made 
the conference possible, and the Cardozo Law Review, especially Robin Flicker, for assuming 
the responsibility for coordinating the arrangements for the conference. 
• Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was nominated by President Reagan to the United 
States Supreme Court on June 17, 1986. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1986, at A8, col. 6. He was 
confirmed by the Senate on Wednesday, Sept. 17, 1986 by a vote of 98 to 0. N.Y. Times, Sept. 
18, 1986, at Al, cols. 1 & 2. He took his seat on the Court as an Associate Justice on October 
6, 1986. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1986 at Al, col. 3. 
2 E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring in part and concurring in judgment); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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would interpret the Constitution narrowly and seek to undo a genera­
tion of Court-created rights. 
Scalia would seem to have fulfilled his nominator's hopes. He 
would discard the doctrine of substantive due process as unjustified^ 
and considers prior Supreme Court decisions based on a substantive 
due process analysis as illegitimate and deserving of being overruled. 
As a result, Scalia favors—almost pleads for—the overruling of Roe v. 
Wade, the momentous 1973 decision that provided women with a 
constitutionally protected right to an abortion. He unequivocally as­
serts that "federal courts have no business" addressing the "difficult, 
indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by the constantly in­
creasing power of science to keep the human body alive for longer 
than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it."^ Scalia has 
also urged that political party membership is a constitutionally per­
missible consideration in the dispensation of public employment.® As 
he emphatically stated: "The choice between patronage and the merit 
principle—or, to be more realistic about it, the choice between the 
desirable mix of merit and patronage principles in widely varying fed­
eral, state, and local political contexts—is not so clear that I would be 
prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible prescrip­
tion into the Constitution.'" He has argued strongly that the Consti­
tution does not permit state and local governments to implement 
affirmative action plans unless such plans are "necessary to eliminate 
their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification."® 
Scalia was the only dissenter in a case in which the majority sustained 
a congressional statute creating the independent prosecutor,' which 
grew out of the Watergate scandal. 
The attention given to Scalia's writings results not just from the 
outcomes he reaches, but also from his insistence on originalism as 
the most defensible interpretative method for construing the Constitu­
tion. Although Professor David Strauss has raised in his paper seri­
ous questions as to whether Scalia is a consistent "originalist,'"° 
3 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-60. 
* 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See. e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. at 
3064. 
3 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2859. 
® See Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. at 2746 (Scalia, J., dissentine) 
Id. at 2747. 
8 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
9 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia was also the 
only dissenter in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989). 
Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1710-11 
(1991). See also Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
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Scalia, as Professor Burt argued in his article, "emphatically rejects 
the proposition that 'interpretation [of the Constitution] must change 
from age to age' and that the proper function of the Supreme Court is 
'to apply current societal values' in constitutional adjudication."" In­
stead, Scalia insists that the original intent of the drafters of the Con­
stitution is, as Professor Burt has characterized his views, "the only 
legitimate source of constitutional authority."" Scalia acknowledges 
the difficulties of reconstructing the intention of the framers, but he 
contends that the defects of originalism are preferable to those that 
result when a judge invokes fundamental values as the touchstone for 
constitutional interpretation." 
Although Scalia's outcomes and method are mainly responsible 
for the attention his writings currently receive, his superb writing 
style also contributes. This not only means that he chooses his words 
well and that his sentences propel the reader quickly through the text, 
but it also means, as Professor Fried so deftly highlighted during his 
Keynote address,'^ that Justice Scalia's writings engage the reader as 
though he were thinking out loud (for the reader's benefit) as he de­
bated his choice of word and punctuation. Scalia's writings also draw 
attention because he does not shrink from being combative, as when 
he ridiculed a statement of Justice O'Connor's as one that "cannot be 
taken seriously,"" or colorfully maintained that the nine members of 
the Court were no more able than "nine people picked at random 
from the Kansas City telephone directory" to decide when life be­
comes "worthless" or when medical procedures to preserve it become 
"inappropriate" or "extraordinary."" 
Scalia's notoriety on the high Court seems also due to his willing­
ness to go it alone. Fiercely insistent on his positions, he is willing— 
perhaps eager—to pen an opinion even though it is not eventually 
joined by one of his colleagues. The immediate result of this penchant 
is a growing body of opinions to which Scalia has given a strong per­
sonal stamp. The long-term consequence of this tendency, however. 
1' Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1685, 1687 (1991). 
12 Id.. 
•3 Scalia, supra note 10, at 863. During his confirmation hearings, Scalia informed the 
Senate Judiciary Committee; "I think it is fair to say you would not regard me as someone who 
would be likely to use the phrase, living constitution." Hearings before the Committee of the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 48 & 142 (August 5 & 6, 1986). 
1^ Regrettably, Professor Fried did not wish to publish his Keynote address. 
•5 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring in part and concurring in judgment). 
16 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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may be that Scalia runs the risk of "being marginalized," at least as 
one academic observer has noted.'' 
Scalia is prolific and his writings are so voluminous as to chal­
lenge any effort to make an overall assessment. As a result, the one-
day Cardozo conference was structured on the assumption that less 
was more. Instead of trying to canvass all or most of the subjects he 
has addressed, only four topics were selected. Two of these—his atti­
tude toward precedent and his conception of the good society—were 
somewhat open-ended and crisscrossed many fields. The other two— 
Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation and the commerce 
clause—were more circumscribed. The consequence of narrowing 
our focus, I believe, is that the conference participants bore deeper 
into their subject than they collectively could have, had we increased 
the number of substantive topics to be explored. 
i'' The Court's Mr. Right, NEWSWEEK, November 5, 1990, at 62. 
